Abstract: In this paper, we consider the problem of active model discrimination amongst a finite number of affine models with uncontrolled and noise inputs, each representing a different system operating mode that corresponds to a fault type or an attack strategy, or to an unobserved intent of another robot, etc. The active model discrimination problem aims to find optimal separating inputs that guarantee that the outputs of all the affine models cannot be identical over a finite horizon. This will enable a system operator to detect and uniquely identify potential faults or attacks, despite the presence of process and measurement noise. Since the resulting model discrimination problem is a nonlinear non-convex mixed-integer program, we propose to solve this in a computationally tractable manner, albeit only approximately, by proposing a sequence of restrictions that guarantee that the obtained input is separating. Finally, we apply our approach to attack detection in the area of cyber-physical systems security.
INTRODUCTION
The public interest in the integration of smart systems into everyday lives is on the rise. These systems, also known as cyber-physical systems (CPS) and include smart homes, smart grids, intelligent transportation and smart cities, are essentially engineered systems that consist of interacting networks of physical and computational components. However, as more and more components and functionalities become integrated, there is an increased risk of unintended system faults and also intentional attacks. Recent attack incidents, e.g., the Maroochy water breach, the StuxNet computer worm and industrial security incidents [Cárdenas et al. (2008); Farwell and Rohozinski (2011) ], highlight a need to address the security of CPS.
Model discrimination as a tool to detect faults, attacks or more broadly, the system mode of operation, is an important common problem in statistics, machine learning and systems theory. Hence, algorithms developed for this problem can have a significant impact on a wide array of problems in CPS security, robotics, process control, medical devices, fault detection, etc.
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as fault or attack detection and isolation, mode estimation in hybrid systems and intention estimation in humanrobot interactions. The model discrimination approaches can be broadly categorized as passive and active methods. In passive methods, the aim is to guarantee discrimination regardless of the input applied to the system, while active methods seek an input that guarantees distinction among models. The former provides "stronger" guarantees but is limited to problems with specific system properties, while the latter is "weaker" but is more widely applicable.
The control and hybrid systems community are predominantly interested in finding system properties that lead to model discrimination. In the spirit of active methods, Grewal and Glover (1976) and Babaali and Egerstedt (2004) introduced the system properties of distinguishability and controlled-discernibility, respectively as the existence of an input that enables distinguishing between the generated trajectories for a given time horizon for all admissible initial conditions. As the passive counterpart, Lou and Si (2009); Rosa and Silvestre (2011) introduced the concept of input-distinguishability, i.e., the ability to distinguish between the behaviors of two linear models for a given time horizon regardless of the inputs applied to the models.
On the other hand, the fault detection and isolation community is more focused on the development of computationally tractable model discrimination algorithms. In Harirchi and Ozay (2015, 2016); Harirchi et al. (2016) , a computational method for passively discriminating among
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On the other hand, the fault detection and isolation community is more focused on the development of computationally tractable model discrimination algorithms. In Harirchi and Ozay (2015, 2016); Harirchi et al. (2016) , a computational method for passively discriminating among fault models is proposed, where a time horizon length that is sufficient for providing guarantees on discrimination of system and fault models is calculated (referred to as the T -detectability problem). Then, a model invalidation approach is proposed to detect and isolate different fault models in real-time with a receding horizon scheme without compromising detection/isolation guarantees.
A great deal of attention is also given to model-based active fault detection approaches. In Nikoukhah and Campbell ( (2016), set-membership approaches are proposed to isolate multiple linear time-varying models subject to uncertainties and noise. However, these approaches either suffer from expensive computation or numerical instability when uncertainties are directly described by polytopic constraints, or they sacrifice optimality by approximating these polytopes with zonotopes for computational tractability. In contrast, our recent work in Jacobsen et al. (2017), in the context of intention estimation in autonomous vehicles, considers an active method for discriminating among a set of affine models with uncontrolled inputs using a Mixed-Integer Linear Program with Special Ordered Sets constraints. This approach can directly handle polyhedral uncertainties and can also consider asymmetric responsibilities for state bounds satisfaction in multi-agent interactions. However, the effect of noise was neglected, and it was also assumed that the excitation input does not affect the state constraints.
Then again, the CPS security community is concerned with both finding system properties and algorithm development. The property of strong detectability/observability of each model has been found to be a necessary condition in Yong et al. (2015); Fawzi et al. (2014) for detection and isolation of data injection attacks, and passive attack detection algorithms have been proposed using SMT solvers in Shoukry et al. (2014) , state observers in Pasqualetti et al. (2013) , l 1 -relaxations in Fawzi et al. (2014) and mode estimation filters in Yong et al. (2015) . To our best knowledge, active attack detection via input design has not been explored. The "closest" existing methods use input watermarks [Mo et al. (2015) ] and moving targets [Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ] to aid attack detection.
Contributions.
In this paper, we present an active approach for discriminating among a set of affine models with uncontrolled inputs, which extends our previous work in Jacobsen et al. (2017) . We additionally consider noise in the modeling framework (to be distinguished from uncontrolled inputs) and relaxed a relatively strong assumption that the designed input cannot affect the state constraints that the uncontrolled input is responsible for. This results in a nonlinear non-convex mixed-integer program. We propose to solve this in a computationally tractable manner, albeit only approximately, by proposing a sequence of restrictions. Instead of relaxations that result in the loss of feasibility, our solution is guaranteed to be feasible in the sense that the obtained input guarantees the discrimination among models, but the resulting objective value may be suboptimal. Moreover, to the extent of our knowledge, our work is the first to apply active model discrimination to attack detection problems in CPS, which we illustrate with a fraud detection scenario in smart buildings. Fig. 1 . Four zone radiant system with two heaters
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: FRAUD DETECTION
As a motivation for the input design problem studied in this paper, we consider a potential utility bill fraud scenario in smart buildings. Specifically, we consider attacks on a building heat management system that intelligently regulates the indoor temperature by a feedback law based on weather forecast and sensor readings. An attack takes the form of sensor measurement manipulation by a tenant (via data injection attack) in order to achieve his/her own desired temperature range by taking advantage of the temperature regulation system of the building. Ideally, an attacker aims to remain undetected, hence paying less in utility bills than his/her actual energy consumption.
From our perspective as the building manager, this attack scenario can result in higher utility costs, thus there is an incentive for detecting potential sensor data injection attacks. At the same time, to make the case for intentional fraud, there is also a need to make sure that the change of temperature is not a result of a serendipitous fault.
For instance, consider a building floor with two apartments and a common area (Room 3), where the left apartment consists of Room 1 and the right apartment consists of Rooms 2 and 4 (cf. Fig. 1 ). Suppose further that the intelligent building heating management regulates the floor temperature to approximately 21
• C when the ambient temperature is (10 ± 2)
• C. A possible attack scenario is that the left/right tenant chooses to intentionally decrease the temperature reading of the apartment in order to trick the heating management system into heating his/her apartment to the desired temperature range between 24
• C and 26
• C. On the other hand, the higher temperature may also be a result of an accidental persistent fault in the temperature regulation system. Thus, our objective as the building manager is to minimally perturb the temperature regulation system in order to conclusively distinguish among a nominal, a fault and an attack scenario, hence detecting an intentional fraud.
PRELIMINARIES

Notation and Definitions
Let x ∈ R n denote a vector and M ∈ R n×m represent a matrix. The vector norm of x is denoted by x i with i ∈ {1, 2, ∞}, M T denotes the transpose of M, while 1 and I represent the vector of ones and the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions, respectively. The diag and vec operators are defined for a collection of matrices M i , i = 1, . . . , n and matrix M as follows:
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